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INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance of this paper is in discussion of the wholesale 
obliteration of religious and other rights among Australian Aboriginal 
people, constituting a subspecies of continuing genocide. The Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of Australia states its directive on religion as 
follows. 
 
“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any 
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for 
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test 
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust 
under the Commonwealth.”1 
 
This constitutional section prohibits the making of laws, as stated, but 
does not prohibit administrative action imposing religious procedures. 
Neither does it prohibit official administrative action to restrain the free 
exercise of religion in Australia. 
Indeed, persuasive case law agrees with this proposition. In the 1984 
case of Grace Bible Church v Reedman,
2
 the appellant argued that in 
Australia there was “an inalienable right to religious freedom and that that 
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freedom cannot be abridged by any statute of the South Australian 
Parliament.”3 The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia 
dismissed the appeal unanimously. Zelling J opined that the appellant‟s 
submission would compel a rewriting of history. This was in the light of 
examples of the intersection of the law, government and religion in the 
United Kingdom, when the common law was received in Australia.
4
 
White J held that the common law recognised the supremacy of 
Parliaments. As such, it never prevented the Parliament from exercising 
“an absolute right to interfere with religious worship and the expression of 
religious beliefs at any time that it liked”.5 He added that the common law 
never included a basic guarantee of an inalienable right to religious 
freedom and expression.
6
 
As to the receiving of the English common law in Australia, the 
British Parliament had passed “an Act to Provide for the Administration 
of Justice in New South Wales and Van Diemen‟s Land” in 1828.7 Section 
24 of this Act stated: “That all Laws and Statutes in force within the 
Realm of England at the Time of the passing of this Act . . . shall be 
applied in the Administration of Justice in the Courts of New South Wales 
and Van Diemen‟s Land respectively, so far as the same can be applied 
within the said Colonies”.8 The wording of the statute applies English law 
only conditionally. However, by the statute, the state Church of England 
became the established and state-run Church in Australia.
9
 This inferred 
no separation between church and state. 
Thus, imposing administrative procedures, of a religious nature, 
within the court system, is not proscribed by the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, and further must be compared with the 
strictures of Magna Carta‟s requirement for judgment of all freemen by 
the law of the land, or in other words, the substantive law.
10
 This paper 
                                                     
3
 Ibid 377. 
4
 Ibid 379. 
5
 Ibid 385. 
6
 Ibid 388. 
7
 9 Geo IV c 83. 
8
 Ibid s 24. 
9
 It is notable that the Chief Judge in Equity in the State of New South Wales also 
sits on the New South Wales Anglican Church Synod. 
10
 Magna Carta (1297) s XXIX states: „NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, 
or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or 
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor 
[condemn him,] but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. 
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or 
Right.‟ 
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argues that this imposition is exactly what has happened in Australia, 
according to the English common law, to the detriment of the Australian 
Aborigines. These people could never have been freemen within the 
meaning of Magna Carta. 
The purpose of this paper is to depict, through the lens of priestly 
cultus and an apprehension of judicial bias, how abstract and removed the 
justice system can feel for Australian Aboriginal peoples, in the context of 
a foreign concept of being a freeman. It imposes on them a foreign 
religion and culture, to which they have no ancient loyalty. In 
Nulyarimma v Thompson Genocide Case, Australian Aboriginal litigants 
commenced a prerogative action in mandamus to seek relief against 
genocide.
11
 Justice Crispin held that Australia did not have a domestic law 
against genocide, while adding that genocide had continued to occur in 
Australia. His honor held that British settlers and colonial officials 
committed acts of genocide during the colonization of Australia.
12
 He held 
that it appeared that this was contrary even to the English law at the time 
of colonization.
13
 
The scholarship has already suggested links between judicatures and 
religion, by judges exercising a kind of authority arising from principles 
of the organization of institutional religion, known as cultus.
14
 Judges in 
Western countries, in effect, practiced priest craft, by asserting their 
authority on the same cultus bases as the priest.
15
 
Therefore, this article asks whether the Australian courts are ignoring 
Aboriginal genocide claims, and if so, how? It tries to show that the 
Australian courts tend to prefer procedural rules to the substantive law in 
matters of Aboriginal claims for relief against genocide. The article will 
test two hypotheses, the first being that Australian courts ignore the 
common law against genocide through their operative cultus.
16
 The 
                                                     
11
 In the matter of an Application for a Writ of Mandamus Directed to Phillip R 
Thompson Ex parte Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, Isobel Coe, Billy Craigie and 
Robbie Thorpe (Applicants), Tom Trevorrow, Irene Watson, Kevin Buzzacott and 
Michael J Anderson (Intervenors) [1998] ACTSC 136. 
12
 Ibid [78]. 
13
 Ibid [32]. 
14
 Larry Cata Backer, „Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the 
Dominion of American Judges‟ [2003] 12 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 
101, 4. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 See below for a discussion of the description of cultus as meaning the 
routinized ritual process, evidenced in public loyalty, representing certain inner 
principles and meanings, performed publicly without reference to those inner 
meanings. 
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second hypothesis is that the Australian judicature has declined to enforce 
the law against child sexual abuse of Aboriginal children, as an indicator 
of genocide, and indicating judicial bias. 
The paper‟s methodology is one of cumulative synthesis as the paper‟s 
argument proceeds.
17
 Argument is delimited to viewing the problem 
through the lenses of cultus and apprehended bias. The focus will begin 
with a discussion of Australian Aborigines and their human rights issues 
related to genocide. This will serve to introduce the Australian Aborigines 
and the Aboriginal rights problem in connection with the Australian 
judiciary. Following this context-setting section, argument proceeds by 
explaining the cultus, or, religion perspective, and the bias, or law, 
perspective. Finally argument uses these two perspectives, synthesized 
together, to analyze the case of Ngurampaa Limited v Brewarrina Shire 
Council.
18
 In Ngurampaa, a serving Aboriginal “Ghillar” Elder, Mr 
Michael Eckford, a non-lawyer, sought prerogative relief in prohibition. 
He wanted to prevent the Brewarrina Shire Council operating a 
government on his people‟s lands while trespassing on them, and their 
consequent taxing of his people by statute, without the express public 
consent of the taxed.
19
 
The outcome of the research is likely to suggest that cultus is a widely 
acceptable system of rites formed by priestly artifice. In the legal system, 
cultus manifests as what Lord Diplock called over-judicialization,
20
 
leading to a doctrine of a “legally reasonable observer”. The cultus 
procedure of the court could remove the litigant‟s choice of determining 
judicial bias, and eliminate the possibility of protection through due 
process as a freeman under Magna Carta. In Ngurampaa Limited v 
Brewarrina Shire Council,
21
 there was apprehended bias by virtue of overt 
and sustained cultic utterances by the judge. 
 
 
 
                                                     
17
 Lonergan described methodology as a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results; Bernard Joseph 
Fancis Lonergan, Method in Theology (Longman & Todd 1975) 5. 
18
 Ngurampaa Limited v Brewarrina Shire Council [2014] NSWSC 524. 
19
 The Rhetorica Ad Herennium sets out six sources of law: nature; statute; 
custom; previous judgments; equity; and, agreement. Statute is law enacted with 
express public consent: Harry Caplan (trs), Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Harvard 
University Press 2004) 91, 93. 
20
 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 (HL) 97. 
21
 Ngurampaa (n 18). 
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AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Argument begins with an introduction to Australian Aborigines and 
Aboriginal problems in connection with the Australian judiciary. 
Australian Aboriginal people and their cultures are interwoven with the 
land and its creation mythologies. Their laws are well-developed and 
stabilized over some 60,000 years, each Aboriginal nation possessing a 
legislative debating structure, chief law officers and ancient mythological 
narratives to explain their laws. Their legal structures possess a 
transmission system using dance and song, by which the laws are both 
preserved and transmitted through the generations.
22
 They have councils 
of elders, which resemble presidential commissions, and who appear to be 
very conservative in their decision-making. They preferred to err on the 
side of maintaining and observing the old laws.
23
 
The Australian Museum has written about the Australian Aboriginal 
Peoples, stating that these peoples had occupied Australia for at least 
60,000 years. They evolved with the land, viewing the land as a whole 
environment that sustained, and was sustained, by the Aboriginal peoples 
and their cultures.
24
 Thus, the land was the core of their spirituality.
25
 
They and their entire culture could be said to be appurtenant to the land. 
When British colonizers first arrived in Australia in 1770, they 
designated Australia as “terra nullius” and claimed all the land, despite the 
fact they had not seen more than a tiny fraction of the land. Neither had 
they circumnavigated and mapped the continent. Terra nullius is a Latin 
term meaning “land belonging to no one”. By using the principle of terra 
nullius, the British Government claimed sovereignty over Australia, 
ignoring the rights and sovereignties of Aboriginal people, organized into 
some 250 nations, who had lived there for at least 60,000 years.
26
 
                                                     
22
 Since ancient times, kings had used mimetic symbols techniques, such as dance 
and plays, to communicate their power and their laws to the illiterate populace by 
analogy to what the populace already believed and understood. Lillian B Lawler, 
„Proteus Is a Dancer‟ (1943) 36 The Classical Journal 116, 116-17. 
23
 Gary Lilienthal, Interview with Michael Eckford (Sydney, 22 April 2014). Mr 
Eckford is a „Ghillar‟, or senior Aboriginal Elder, of an Aboriginal nation situated 
in the North West of the Australian state of New South Wales. 
24
 Stuart Humphreys, „The Land‟ (Australian Museum, 24 December 2009) 
<http://australianmuseum.net.au/indigenous-australia-the-land> accessed 24 April 
2015. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
151 
However Aboriginal people fought, and still fight, for their land and 
lives.
27
 British colonizers progressively dispossessed Aboriginal people of 
their land.
28
 The issue of title has never been resolved, with many 
Aboriginal people claiming allodial title
29
 to the entire Australian 
Continent, and colonial settlers‟ descendants operating a system of 
Torrens Title
30
 to the Australian Continent‟s lands. 
Thus, in the seminal 1992 High Court of Australia case on Aboriginal 
land rights, Mabo and others v State of Queensland,
31
 Brennan J stated as 
follows: 
 
“The common law of this country would perpetuate injustice if it 
were to continue to embrace the notion of terra nullius and persist 
in characterising the Indigenous inhabitants of the Australian 
colonies as people too low in the scale of social organisation to be 
acknowledged as possessing rights and interests in land.”32 
 
In the Australian judicial hierarchy, there is a state hierarchy for each 
of the states and territories, and another Federal judicial hierarchy. The 
High Court of Australia is at the apex of all the judicial hierarchies. In 
1998, Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, a Gungalidda Elder from Doomadgee, 
in Australia‟s northeastern Gulf of Carpentaria, commenced a genocide 
                                                     
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Allodial lands are the absolute property of their owner. They are not subject to 
any rent, service, or acknowledgment to a superior holder. Allodial title is the 
opposite of feudal land tenure: James Clarke Holt, Colonial England 1066–1215 
(The Hambledown Press 1997) 115. 
30
 A Torrens title is a single certificate of title for an allotment of land. The 
certificate is issued administratively, and abolishes deeds of transfer of title, 
drawn up by the parties to the transfer. It is the most common type of title in 
British Commonwealth countries. All transactions such as transfers of 
ownerships, are registered on the certificate of title. The Torrens title certificate 
shows: details of who currently owns the property, any easements, registered on 
the property, any encumbrances, registered on the property, and the title's unique 
reference details. Torrens title was designed in the Colony of South Australia 
after an 1839 fire destroyed the Colony‟s district maps. After 1842, district 
divisions were replaced gradually by counties and hundreds, and the government 
resurveyed and renumbered the land: „Torrens Title‟ (Government of South 
Australia, 26 May 2015) <https://www.sa.gov.au/topics/housing-property-and-
land/property-and-place-information/certificates-of-title/understanding-types-of-
titles/torrens-titles> accessed 30 April 2015. 
31
 [1992] 175 CLR 1. 
32
 Ibid [41] (Brennan J). 
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action in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory against the 
sitting Prime Minister of the time and the entire Federal Parliament, over 
the government‟s Native Title Act33 statutory amendments. The sitting 
Prime Minister promised what he called “bucket loads of extinguishment” 
of Native Title rights and interests,
34
 so to pave the way for unimpeded 
mining and other kinds of development. 
The Australian Capital Territory had ruled Aborigines pursuant to a 
1954 Ordinance, signed into law personally by the Queen,
35
 and later 
repealed on 11th November 1965. Thus, official colonization activities 
continued in Australia in 1965. Section 10 of that Ordinance stated as 
follows. 
 
“For the purposes of section seven of this Ordinance inspections 
and the last preceding section, a member of the police force, or an 
Inquiries person authorized in writing by the Minister, shall have 
access at all reasonable times to an aboriginal at any place in 
which he is residing or employed and may make such inspections 
and inquiries as that member or person thinks fit.”36 
 
This ordinance section granted police and other officials unfettered 
authority to inspect and inquire into Aborigines as the equivalent of an on-
going and unlimited investigation. Thus, Aboriginal people were subject 
to constant surveillance while living the most private parts of their lives, 
including their secret rites. This abridged their freedom of what they saw 
as religious and other cultural activities, and, it amounted to treating them 
as the inspecting officials‟ property.37 
                                                     
33
 Native Title Act 1993 (Australia). 
34
 „Native Title Report - July 1996 to June 1997: Report of the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner to the Attorney-General as 
Required by Section 209 of the Native Title Act 1993‟ (Australian Government, 
2001) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/pdf/social_justice/nat
ive_title_report_97.pdf> accessed 24 April 2015. 
35
 An Ordinance relating to Aborigines No 8 of 1954 (Australian Capital 
Territory). 
36
 Ibid s 10. 
37
 International Labour Organization, Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade 
and Slavery, 1926, as amended by The Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, 1956. Art 1 of the 1926 Convention defined slavery as: „the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised‟. 
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In this Nulyarimma v Thompson Genocide Case, the ACT Supreme 
Court, in Canberra, heard a prerogative action in mandamus against 
Australian Capital Territory officials.
38
 Justice Crispin held that Australia 
did not have a domestic law against genocide, while admitting from the 
bench that genocide had continued to occur in Australia. Crispin‟s ruling 
was upheld on appeal in the Federal Court of Australia.
39
 Justice Crispin 
made a landmark declaration on the subject of genocide committed 
against Aboriginal Peoples of Australia. His honor held that there was 
ample evidence to satisfy the Court that acts of genocide were committed 
during the colonization of Australia.
40
 He held it was clear from what he 
called “the bloody pages of Australian history” that the comprehensive 
destruction of Aboriginal peoples coincided with an equally extensive and 
unlawful usurpation of their lands. His honor held that in the light of 
current knowledge, it appeared that this course was contrary even to the 
English law prevailing at the time of colonization.
41
 This suggested a 
subsisting English common law against the commission of criminal 
genocide, which the Australian courts were either unwilling to discover, 
or were prevented from such discovery by the nature of the pleadings. 
Pointing to a defect in the element of international relations within 
Australian sovereignty, and emphasizing the irony of the dictum of 
Brennan J, as above, Justice Crispin went on to conclude that Australia 
did not act as a civilized country,
42
 because it appeared to him that, while 
the law effectively ratified the Convention,
43
 it did not purport to 
incorporate the provisions of the Convention into Australian municipal 
law.
44
 He concluded that no criminal offence of genocide existed in the 
domestic law of Australia.
45
 
                                                     
38
 Nulyarimma (n 11). 
39
 Nulyarimma v Thompson [1999] FCA 1192. 
40
 Nulyarimma (n 11) [78]. 
41
 Ibid [32]. 
42
 „Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951‟ (The International Court 
of Justice, 28 May 1951) 
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum=276&code=ppcg&p1=3&p2=4&ca
se=12&k=90&p3=5> accessed 1 June 2015. 
43
 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 
December 1948. 
44
 Nulyarimma (n 11) [66]; and see International Criminal Court (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2002 (Australia), ss 268.121-268.122. 
45
 Nulyarimma (n 11) [73]. 
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The possibility of a subsisting common law against the commission of 
genocide, coupled with the Court‟s finding that no criminal offence of 
genocide existed in the domestic law of Australia,
46
 constituted an 
unexplored paradox in the state of the Australian common law. The inner-
doctrine of the law against genocide had disappeared into this apparent 
judicial non sequitur. One hypothesis would be that, while the common 
law prohibited genocide, the courts simply ignored acts of genocide by 
some kind of special cultus-style of arrangement in the court rules. Thus, 
the question arises as to what aspects of court procedure might facilitate 
the ignoring of genocide. 
During the case‟s appeal to the full bench of the Federal Court of 
Australia,
47
 one level below the High Court of Australia in the Australian 
judicial hierarchy, the Australian Government articulated its policy on 
Aboriginal genocide through the Australian government‟s Chief Legal 
Counsel, a Queens‟ Counsel Barrister-at-law. He stated that the Australian 
Government “deliberately did not enact the Genocide Convention”,48 and 
continued as follows. 
 
“…there are good reasons why this court should be very slow to 
create a new civil cause of action based on an international right 
which parliament has deliberately chosen not to directly 
incorporate into Australian criminal law.”49 
 
From the Australian Government‟s perspective, the thought of a 
massive award in general damages in tort might dwarf their repugnance to 
any conviction for a criminal offence. The International Court of Justice 
had inferred,
50
 in its deliberations on the Genocide Convention,
51
 that a 
country could not be considered civilized if it did not have a law to 
prevent genocide.
52
 
                                                     
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Thompson (n 39). 
48
 Federal Court transcript Nulyarimma v Thompson No A 5 of 1999 and No S 23 
of 1999, 31 May 1999 at nulbu 31.5.99 P-4. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 „Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951‟ (n 42).  
51
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 43). 
52
 The preparation of the Convention on Genocide shows that an undertaking was 
reached within the General Assembly on the faculty to make reservations and that 
it is permitted to conclude therefrom that States, becoming parties to the 
Convention, gave their assent thereto. What is the character of the reservations 
which may be made and the objections, which may be raised thereto? The 
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“The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by 
civilised nations as binding on States even without any 
conventional obligation. It was intended that the Convention 
would be universal in scope. Its purpose is purely humanitarian 
and civilising.”53 
 
The Preamble to the Genocide Convention stated as follows. 
 
“HAVING CONSIDERED the declaration made by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 
December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, 
contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and 
condemned by the civilized world.”54 
 
All those signing the Convention effectively condemned genocide, 
unless they failed to facilitate a jurisdiction under which they could 
prosecute those responsible for committing the crime of genocide. To 
behave otherwise would defeat any such condemnation. It would most 
certainly require that signatory nations would not commit genocide. 
The Commonwealth of Australia has still not fully reduced the 
Genocide Convention
55
 into its municipal law, although Australia was the 
third country to sign the Convention on 8th July 1949.
56
 For example, 
                                                                                                                        
solution must be found in the special characteristics of the Convention on 
Genocide. The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by civilised 
nations as binding on States even without any conventional obligation. It was 
intended that the Convention would be universal in scope. Its purpose is purely 
humanitarian and civilising. The contracting States do not have any individual 
advantages or disadvantages nor interests of their own, but merely a common 
interest. This leads to the conclusion that the object and purpose of the 
Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the 
States which adopted it, that as many States as possible should participate. This 
purpose would be defeated if an objection to a minor reservation should produce 
complete exclusion from the Convention; „Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 
May 1951‟ (n 42). 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 43). 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid. 
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
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only some parts of the Genocide Convention were imported into 
Australian domestic law.
57
 Only the Australian Attorney General could 
commence a genocide case, and if the Attorney General had some reason 
to refuse, and did refuse to prosecute, there was no right of appeal and no 
statement of reasons was required.
58
 A complainant seeking to sue for 
                                                                                                                        
religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article III: The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
57
 International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 
(Australia), ss 268.121-268.122. 
58
 Ibid s 268.121.  
Bringing proceedings under this Division 
(1) Proceedings for an offence under this Division must not be commenced 
without the Attorney General‟s written consent. 
(2) An offence against this Division may only be prosecuted in the name of the 
Attorney General. 
(3) However, a person may be arrested, charged, remanded in custody, or released 
on bail, in connection with an offence under this Division before the necessary 
consent has been given. 
268.122 Attorney General‟s decisions in relation to consents to be final 
(1) Subject to any jurisdiction of the High Court under the Constitution, a 
decision by the Attorney General to give, or to refuse to give, a consent under 
section 268.121: 
(a) is final; and 
(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in 
question; and 
(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari. 
(2) The reference in subsection (1) to a decision includes a reference to the 
following: 
(a) a decision to vary, suspend, cancel or revoke a consent that has been given; 
(b) a decision to impose a condition or restriction in connection with the giving 
of, or a refusal to give, a consent or to remove a condition or restriction so 
imposed; 
(c) a decision to do anything preparatory to the making of a decision to give, or to 
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genocide simply could not commence a genocide action in Australia. This 
placed the decision firmly into the political field, as was contrary to the 
intent of the long-standing Genocide Convention,
59
 to which Australia 
was a high contracting party. 
In 2007, the Government of the Northern Territory of Australia 
published what was known as the “Little Children are Sacred” report.60 In 
this report were many allegations of Aboriginal child sexual abuse 
perpetrated by Aboriginal men, but with no matching record of wide-scale 
prosecutions of Aboriginal men for this crime. The Australian 
Government acted on the report, without public consultation and without 
prosecutions in the courts, with what many Aborigines viewed as a 
military invasion.
61
 On 21 June 2007, after the release of the “Little 
Children are Sacred” report,62 the Australian Federal Government 
announced the Northern Territory Emergency Response, also commonly 
known as “the intervention”, suggestive of mass psychological harm to 
Aboriginal men by virtue of these public denunciations.
63
 They used the 
term in a common psychological or psychotherapeutic sense, and thereby 
avoided the country‟s judicature. This sent a clear signal to the judicature, 
a possible breach in the separation of powers within the Australian 
Constitution,
64
 indicating the judicature ought comply with the 
government‟s intervention-related military policies. 
                                                                                                                        
refuse to give, a consent or preparatory to the making of a decision referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (b), including a decision for the taking of evidence or the holding 
of an inquiry or investigation; 
(d) a decision doing or refusing to do anything else in connection with a decision 
to give, or to refuse to give, a consent or a decision referred to in paragraph (a), 
(b) or (c); 
(e) a failure or refusal to make a decision whether or not to give a consent or a 
decision referred to in a paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d). 
59
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (n 
43). 
60
 Government of the Northern Territory, Report of the Northern Territory Board 
of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, 2007. 
61
 The Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre, The Invasion of Northern Territory 
Aboriginal Communities and its Implications for Tasmania, 2007. 
62
 Report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of 
Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse (n 60). 
63
 „The NT Intervention and Human Rights‟ (Amnesty International, 2007) 
<http://www.amnesty.org.au/hre/comments/24400> accessed 24 April 2015. 
64
 See the structure of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, and 
see the High Court of Australia case of Kable v DPP (1997) 189 CLR 51, in 
which the High Court of Australia found there to be no separation of powers in 
the State of New South Wales. 
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With a paucity of prosecutions, and a military intervention later to be 
judged internationally as specious, the reader might consider that the 
judicature and the police had declined to enforce the law against child 
sexual abuse, as an indicator of genocide. In this hypothesis, it could be 
because it might have interrupted the Report‟s evidence of Aboriginal 
self-destruction, and made it easier to maintain a policy of usurping 
Aboriginal allodial title to their ancient lands. This hypothesis strongly 
demands a consideration of systemic apprehended bias within the 
judicature. 
The Australian Government deployed the following policies as part of 
the “intervention”. (a) The Government introduced management of 50% 
people‟s welfare income, dictating how the money was to be spent.65 (b) It 
introduced compulsory leases of Aborigine-owned land, giving the 
government “exclusive possession” of Aboriginal land for five years. 
These leases under military duress allowed the Government to repair, 
demolish, or replace any existing building without the owners‟ consent.66 
(c) They introduced blanket bans on alcohol, gambling and pornography 
in named communities and placed signs announcing these bans at the 
entrances to Aboriginal communities.
67
 (d) They abolished the permit 
system, which had given Aboriginal people control over who came into 
their traditional lands. The Northern Territory Land Rights Act had 
recognized Aboriginal land as private property, and the permit system was 
designed to ensure Aboriginal people had the same rights as other owners 
of private property.
68
 (e) They offered government services in exchange 
for leases, such as housing and housing maintenance, on the condition that 
Aborigines waived permanently their property rights. To make it legal to 
implement the intervention, the Australian Government suspended the 
Racial Discrimination Act and the Northern Territory anti-discrimination 
laws, in contravention of the government‟s obligations under cognate 
international instruments. Australian and international law prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of race, however the government claimed 
that it was necessary to override human rights in order to protect the 
children, the subject of the “Little Children are Sacred” report.69 
Amnesty International stated that many of the policies of the 
intervention: (a) did not protect children, or were not related to achieving 
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that goal; (b) did not relate to the goals expressed in the media to justify 
the intervention; and, (c) offered benefits to Aborigines that could have 
been provided without breaching human rights.
70
 
 
THE NATURE OF PRIESTLY CULTUS 
 
According to sociological theory, the social system has been 
structured to generate impact without necessarily having to find any 
authoritative person to fill its official public positions. In this way, 
domination and power were relations between persons, and, an organised 
institution was a coherent system of action, regulated in part by these 
personal relationships. Thus, personal influence became transformed 
within a stable institutional system. Weber framed this change using his 
three interconnected ideas of routinization, rationalisation, and 
formalisation.
71
 He believed that these three processes resulted in the 
typical ritualism of institutions. The form of rationalisation of traditional 
authority was the systematic use of ritual procedures in every overt part of 
society‟s life. Formalisation made regular ritual activity purely symbolic, 
meaning it would consist of beliefs, myths and doctrines.
72
  
Ritualization also occurred in other non-traditional systems, signalling 
that, in them, the internal justification of behaviour had become partly 
traditional.
73
 On Weber‟s account, when the legal structure justified public 
authority, its leaders such as a judge or prosecutor did not need charisma, 
on which to base power. Instead, this authority had to be based on a 
systemic precept, such as a procedural doctrine.
74
 Judicial appointments to 
the bench were predicated on the judges‟ symbolic and doctrinal standing 
within the legal profession, and therefore, cognate to priesthood. 
Typically, cultus meant the routinized ritual process, representing 
internal principles and implications, performed publicly by opaque, or 
fungible, officials without reference to those hidden meanings. This would 
suggest such officials were commodified as professionals, their individual 
personalities being veiled and made irrelevant to their official functions. 
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Examples of cultus would include temple service.
75
 Also, they might 
include those public systems of ritual procedures of a court of law, such as 
ritual bowing to the judge, coats of arms on the wall behind the bench, 
court officials stationed in court with de facto priestly functions, use 
within the court of a special dialect of the language, the wearing of black 
robes and sometimes wigs, and the arrangement of the hearing according 
to prescribed procedural rules. 
The word “cultus” is not in everyday usage, and for this reason, its 
investigation might reasonably come from its apparent Latin root. There is 
a comprehensive context of the word “cultus” from the Latin,76 identifying 
this range of meanings: that which is adored;
77
 cultivated or manured;
78
 
honour or deference;
79
 an apparatus of ornamentation;
80
 reverence;
81
 
husbanded;
82
 worshipped;
83
 occupational;
84
 habitual;
85
 respected;
86
 
revered;
87
 celebrated;
88
 tilled;
89
 and, ornate.
90
 The term appears to have 
accommodating facets. 
This range of meanings allows separation of the term “cultus” into 
four generic facets. The allurement facet suggests being adored; an 
apparatus of ornamentation suggests ornateness. It also indicates the 
presence of rhetorical persuasion by ornamentation. The georgic aspect 
indicates being cultivated or manured, husbanded, occupational, habitual, 
tilled.
91
 It also suggests seasonal or customary modifications to nature. 
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The status aspect suggests honor or deference, reverence, being respected 
or revered. All this is suggestive of forces of social hierarchy. The ritual 
facet suggests being worshipped, celebrated, all inferring a routinized 
ceremony.
92
 
In Hegel‟s taxonomy of religions,93 there was a suggestion that 
foundational religion was incomplete and spiritless unless it included a 
cultus to display a human comprehension of nature? This taxonomy 
compared the structure of four versions of determinate religion and 
included cultus as a necessary element of each example religion‟s 
structure,
94
 conveying spirit to the religion‟s adherents. 
Religious, and other groups united by common patterns of belief and 
behaviour, showed that any nonconformity indeed would produce a 
separating conflict. When cultus predominated over theology, ritual 
nonconformity would be a more serious threat to group stability than 
would heresy. This was the case within the antique religious world. 
Individual philosophers dominated questions of belief and theology, in 
ancient polytheism, without any official relationship to the cultus. 
Hierarchies of priests restricted themselves to the operation and 
maintenance of prescribed ceremonials,
95
 sounding somewhat like 
division into the substantive field and the practice of law. 
Cultus is also used to provide a kind of annulment of any anomaly 
between the procedural and substantive issues.
96
 
 
“The expression “Cultus” or “worship” is ordinarily used in the 
narrower sense of external, public actions; this definition does not 
lay stress on the inward activity of the soul. The meaning which 
we shall attach to the word Cultus will comprise this inward 
activity as well as its outward manifestation; this activity is to 
bring about the rehabilitation of the union with the Absolute, and 
is therefore an inner conversion of spirit and soul. [Church] Cultus 
or worship contains, for instance, not only the sacraments, church-
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rites, and duties, but also the so-called “way of salvation” which is 
an absolutely inward history and a succession of acts of the soul, a 
movement which is to take place, and does take place, within the 
soul.”97 
 
Later, argument will suggest that in court cultus the “way of 
salvation” consists in a belief that only the court could decide what law 
was valid, and only the judge could decide whether or not a litigant was 
reasonable. This substance of reasonableness manifested in a show of 
loyalty. Aggregating a key proposition
98
 from Theophilus,
99
 from Clement 
of Alexandria
100
 and Tertullian,
101
 it appeared that the general adherence 
to, and interweaving of, customs was seminal for public respect for a 
religious cultus. There was more evidence for this aggregated public 
loyalty scheme in noting that the ancients derided any religion lacking 
publicly accepted artistic ornamentation. Affluent people preferred to be 
present loyally at worship within a beautiful edifice.
102
 The many went to 
church only for aesthetic delight while common and ignorant people were 
induced to attend only by glittering golden, silver, and ivory decorations, 
suggesting a consecration of avarice. Even Tertullian had admitted the 
pagan reasoning for the arts to be the acceptance of enjoyment of all good 
god-created things offered to men.
103
 From this, only by ceremonial and 
ritual in religious life, were religious practices, attitudes and beliefs 
articulated to, or joined with, the masses.
104
 
In consequence, it appeared that reasonable people would find the 
cultus more acceptable than the inner concepts it represented. Similarly, 
for example, reasonable people would find less authority attributable to 
the courts, if courts were in small, inauthoritative and unornamented 
rooms. Thus, cultus had an alluring effect on reasonable people to make 
priestly functions appear credible. This public facet of cultus married 
cultic functions into acceptable public life, while inner meanings attached 
to them disappeared into a comfortable absence, veiled of any requirement 
to explain. 
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APPREHENDED BIAS 
 
In the English common law world, the concept of fairness in due 
process subsisted as the precepts of natural justice and procedural fairness, 
such as for example within Magna Carta‟s apparent requirment for 
judgment by the substantive law,
105
 but only for freemen. There was a 
suggestion, in this, of due process being veiled. Why not just call it due 
process? In the 1985 High Court of Australia case of Kioa v West,
106
 
Brennan J referred to Lord Diplock‟s dictum on the concept of fairness. 
Lord Diplock observed as follows in Bushell v Secretary of State for the 
Environment.
107
 
 
“To “over-judicialise” the inquiry by insisting on observance of 
the procedures of a court of justice which professional lawyers 
alone are competent to operate effectively in the interests of their 
clients would not be fair.”108 
 
Thus, unfair meant public persuasion by the professional artifice of 
over-judicialisation. Brennan J went on to state as follows. 
 
“Nevertheless in the ordinary case where no problem of 
confidentiality arises an opportunity should be given to deal with 
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adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the 
decision to be made. It is not sufficient for the repository of the 
power to endeavour to shut information of that kind out of his 
mind and to reach a decision without reference to it. Information 
of that kind creates a real risk of prejudice, albeit subconscious, 
and it is unfair to deny a person whose interests are likely to be 
affected by the decision an opportunity to deal with the 
information. He will be neither consoled nor assured to be told 
that the prejudicial information was left out of account.”109 
 
This veiling of subconscious information would allow procedure to 
predominate in the law. Thus, the Judicial Commission of the State of 
New South Wales
110
 stated, in its procedural manual for judges and 
complaints against them, that the test for determining if a judge was 
disqualified for apprehended bias was: “whether a fair-minded lay 
observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an 
impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the 
judge is required to decide”.111 This statement proposed that judges 
assessed their brother judges‟ public apprehensions of bias. The primary 
test for disqualification on the ground of apprehended bias was stated by 
the High Court in the 1994 case of Webb v The Queen,
112
 using the code 
word “reasonable” to suggest a judicially applied objective test, as 
follows: 
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“Whether, in all the circumstances, a fair-minded lay observer 
with knowledge of the material objective facts “might entertain a 
reasonable apprehension that [the judge] might not bring an 
impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the 
question.”„113 
 
The compounded nature of this dictum again suggested a veiled 
substance to fairness. In Webb v The Queen
114
 Deane J sought to 
categorise potentially disqualifying factors into four groups. 
 
“The first is disqualification by interest, that is to say, cases where 
some direct or indirect interest in the proceedings, whether 
pecuniary or otherwise, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of 
prejudice, partiality or prejudgment. The second is disqualification 
by conduct, including published statements. That category consists 
of cases in which conduct, either in the course of, or outside, the 
proceedings, gives rise to such an apprehension of bias. The third 
category is disqualification by association. It will often overlap the 
first and consists of cases where the apprehension of prejudgment 
or other bias results from some direct or indirect relationship, 
experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or 
otherwise involved in, the proceedings. The fourth is 
disqualification by extraneous information. It will commonly 
overlap the third and consists of cases where knowledge of some 
prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance gives rise to the 
apprehension of bias.”115 
 
The High Court of Australia redefined the apprehension of bias 
principle in December 2000 in the case of Ebner v The Official Trustee in 
Bankruptcy.
116
 It laid down a method for applying the apprehension of 
bias principle. This process comprised three steps: (a) Identify what it was 
said might lead a judicial officer to decide a case other than on its legal or 
factual merits. For example, “the judge has shares in the respondent bank” 
or “the judge has a brother who is a partner of the solicitor acting for the 
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respondent”.117 (b) There needed to be an articulation of the logical 
connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of 
deciding the case on its merits.
118
 (c) There needed to be an assessment as 
to whether a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that the 
case might not be decided impartially.
119
 
Following logically from this, in 2006, the High Court of Australia 
handed down its judgment in Forge v Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission,
120
 discussing the application of an apprehension 
of bias principle. Three judges of the court said: 
 
“In applying the apprehension of bias principle to a particular 
case, the question that must be asked is whether a judicial officer 
might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question in 
that case. And that requires no prediction about how the judge will 
in fact approach the matter. Similarly, if the question is considered 
in hindsight, the test is one which requires no conclusion about 
what factors actually influenced the outcome which was reached 
in the case. No attempt need be made to enquire into the actual 
thought processes of the judge; the question is whether the judge 
might not (as a real and not remote possibility rather than as a 
probability) bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the 
relevant question.”121  
 
This altered the view of fairness to how well the judge conformed to 
the court‟s cultus. The court‟s view in Forge v Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission
122
 suggested that the principle of articulation 
stated in Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy,
123
 had been altered 
to be a fair observer‟s perception of the judge‟s fairness. Thus, the 
principle of apprehended bias meant that if the judge felt that a reasonable 
observer felt excluded by the adjectival, or cultic, part of the court‟s 
process, then this observer might attribute to the judge‟s mind a certain 
unfairness. Such a reasonable observer might not coincide with a 
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reasonable Aboriginal aggrieved person. This articulation suggested a 
form of over-judicialisation in operation, per Lord Diplock‟s dictum in 
Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment,
124
 rendering a hearing‟s 
outcome void for apprehended bias. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The tests for apprehended bias suggested the subsistence of a legally 
reasonable person. This term would mean a person who was reasonable by 
virtue of a judicial determination. It appeared that a legally reasonable 
person would find a cultus more acceptable than the system‟s inner 
concepts it represented. Similarly, for example, a legally reasonable 
person would find less authority attributable to the courts, if courts were 
less publicly august, employing less public ornamentation. Such 
ornamentation might include special court architecture, judicial dress and 
the dialect of English used within the court‟s procedures. Thus, cultus had 
an alluring effect on the legally reasonable person to make courtly/priestly 
functions appear credible. 
The principle of apprehended bias meant that if the judge felt that a 
reasonable observer felt excluded by the adjectival, or cultic, part of the 
court‟s process, then this observer might attribute to the judge‟s mind a 
certain unfairness. Such a reasonable observer‟s method of attribution 
would not coincide with a reasonable Aboriginal aggrieved person, in the 
context of the court‟s history of dealing with Aboriginal people, discussed 
above, because such a litigant would not be a legally reasonable person. 
This articulation indicated a form of over-judicialisation in operation, per 
Lord Diplock‟s dictum in Bushell v Secretary of State for the 
Environment,
125
 rendering a hearing‟s outcome void for apprehended bias. 
Since the legally reasonable observer would feel drawn by the court‟s 
various indicia of ornamentation, making judicial pronouncements 
plausible, the principle would fail in the case of an aggrieved person from 
a culture embattled by centuries of war and allegations of genocide, such 
as for example an Aboriginal litigant. This would be because such a 
litigant could never be legally reasonable. 
Aspects of court cultus would include publicly acceptable narrative 
not conforming with reason. They would include a preference for 
established procedure over substantial issues of justice. Finally, consider a 
litigant appearing before a judge, where the judge came onto the bench 
clearly angry with this litigant, in the absence of any presented evidence, 
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then citing procedure over substantive justice, or suggesting that 
procedure was indistinguishable from justice. This litigant would 
apprehend bias. However, the test was whether the judge determined a 
reasonable observer might apprehend bias. The cultus procedure of the 
court could remove the litigant‟s choice of determining judicial bias. This 
abridgment of juridical personality,
126
 as an outcome of court cultus, 
would be a serious defect in reason. 
 
THE NGURAMPAA LIMITED CASE 
 
This section discusses the case of Ngurampaa Limited v Brewarrina 
Shire Council,
127
 in the context of the accumulated findings and 
suggestions from previous sections. The Ngurampaa Limited Case 
represents field data, because this section combines the court transcript 
with personal interviews conducted at court. It assesses the conduct of the 
case in court in the critical context of the legally reasonable person 
discussed above. This legally reasonable person perception of judicial bias 
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would be a construct of the judge‟s mind, rather than the litigant‟s 
assessment of the judge‟s apprehended bias. Thus, the judge would have 
in mind whether or not a fictitious person, not necessarily present in court 
at the time, would apprehend judicial bias. 
The contextual circumstances of the case were as follows. Mr Eckford 
was a well-known Head of the Euahlayi people. He held a rank as Senior 
Elder, or Ghillar, of the Euahlayi people, and also, he was lawman of the 
Euahlayi Nation. His functions within his nation represented the 
consequences of some 60,000 years of human history. Mr Eckford was, in 
the early 1970‟s, one of a small group of founders of the Aboriginal 
Embassy on the lawns of Old Parliament House in Canberra. This 
Embassy still stands to this day and is accorded measures of diplomatic 
immunity by the Australian Government.
128
 
The lands of the Euahlayi Nation had been carefully mapped and 
stretched from inside the State of New South Wales across an Australian 
state border into the State of Queensland. Mr Eckford stated that the 
Euahlayi Nation had acceded to the Statute of Rome, had defined land 
boundaries, routinely conducted international relations and had a fully 
functional legal system. He asserted that the Euahlayi Nation had declared 
its sovereignty in the required forms at international law. The Euahlayi 
Nation legal system included lawmen. These were people who were the 
repositories for maintenance and transmission of the law. It included 
specific methodologies for transmission of the law over archaeological 
periods of time, and also, a functioning legislature structure. He claimed 
an Australian Continental Common Law sanctioned by the ancient 
people
129
 subsisted within the lands of the Euahlayi Nation, from time 
immemorial, and, foreign occupiers could not extinguish this Continental 
common law, merely by ignoring it.
130
 
Mr Eckford argued that, in the mid 1800‟s, British settlers acting for 
the Crown led an unlawful massacre of apparently outlawed members of 
his society, as well as of some Chinese immigrants he claimed were 
peacefully living in the area at the time.
131
 The victims included women, 
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children and very young babies. The burial site of these victims had been 
identified as on the said lands and had been duly investigated by 
generations of Euahlayi officials. Mr Eckford claimed that many 
descendants of the original perpetrators of the said massacre were now 
operating the Brewarrina Shire Council, which Council was established in 
or about 1843. Also, these descendants were variously holding senior and 
professional positions in the neighbourhood.
132
 
He argued further that his people‟s title to the land was 
indistinguishable from allodial title and that his people‟s nation had held a 
community form of allodial title over the described lands for some 60,000 
years. In any event, they had held this title from time immemorial and had 
never abandoned the land. Nor had they acceded to any suggestion of 
colourable title to the land by the British settlers. Having made this 
declaration of allodial title, Mr Eckford argued that the Brewarrina Shire 
Council illegally had set up a government on his people‟s lands, and 
purported inter alia to levy taxes on his people. He stated that his people 
evinced no express public consent to the existence of the Brewarrina Shire 
Council or its acts. He noted that during the period of administration of 
the Brewarrina Shire Council, British settlers acting under Crown 
authority had arranged for his people to be forcibly enslaved, from time to 
time. They removed the children from their parents and transmigrated 
them long distances away, to be denied rights to their own sources of food 
and economy. They had arranged for his people to have been subjected to 
other capricious State of New South Wales Police actions such as regular 
deaths in Police custody. He noted that these actions were now considered 
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to be crimes against humanity.
133
 He further alleged that, by occupying his 
people‟s lands with a government, those people now operating the 
Brewarrina Shire Council were committing continuing criminal trespass, 
as well as civil trespass, accumulating a huge quantum of damages. To 
date, they had no lawful authority to be on the said lands, and therefore 
could not purport to operate a government on the lands.
134
 
By way of jurisdictional analogy, Stern reviewed California courts‟ 
treatment of the foreign law of an antecedent foreign government. He 
cited Ohm v San Francisco,
135
 where the court stated that the foreign law 
of an antecedent foreign government “was deemed to be the law of its 
successor government to the extent to which the old law has created 
property rights, affected status or continues to be in force”.136 Stern 
suggested that this antecedent law would be subject to judicial notice to 
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this extent and would be provable as fact,
137
 and as such, Mr Eckford 
claimed that the Aboriginal law was still in force, with community 
adherents.
138
 
Some time before, Mr Eckford had commenced a substantive action in 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales. His action pleaded for a 
prerogative order in prohibition, to effectively stay a decision of a State of 
New South Wales Magistrate to uphold the Shire Council‟s taxing of the 
Euahlayi people on their own sovereign lands. 
As part of this substantive action, Mr Eckford issued a subpoena to the 
Brewarrina Shire Council to produce to the Supreme Court any deed, or 
any other kind of document, that showed the allodial title to the lands of 
the Euahlayi people had been lawfully transferred to the British Crown in 
right of the State of New South Wales, or to any other person, in such a 
way that they could exercise any sovereignty over the Euahlayi Nation. 
Mr Eckford alleged that, in any event, were such documents to be 
produced to the court, any such transfer thereby evidenced would be void 
for illegality, by virtue of the massacres referred to above.
139
 The 
subpoena‟s inherent assumption, that no such land title transfer had taken 
place, would mean Mr Eckford did not subscribe to the State‟s jurisdiction 
over his lands. This would exclude him as a legally reasonable person in 
the judge‟s mind. Thus, Mr Eckford‟s apprehension of judicial bias 
would, at the outset, be irrelevant to the Court. 
The barrister for the Brewarrina Shire Council, Mr Bell, submitted to 
the Court, and also confirmed to those attending at court that no such 
documents existed.
140
 In consequence of this, Mr Eckford argued that the 
Brewarrina Shire Council had no power of taxation over the Euahlayi 
Nation.
141
 This suggested that there was no deed of transfer of title, no 
deed of cession, or no deed of surrender to any acts of war. Mr Bell‟s 
statement strengthened the view that whoever owned the lands at the time 
of colonisation, had passed the land to their heirs, or had otherwise 
alienated the land. Mr Eckford claimed the lands were not alienated to any 
person, as that would be impossible under transmitted Aboriginal systems 
of law and spirituality.
142
 
The action was an application by the Brewarrina Shire Council to 
strike out Mr Eckford‟s subpoena, described as above, on the grounds that 
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Mr Eckford was not a Solicitor and that the subpoena was generated for a 
collateral purpose. A number of exchanges took place between Mr 
Eckford, Mr Bell, Mr Byers from the Crown Solicitor‟s Office, and the 
Judge.  
Mr Eckford appeared for the Plaintiff, by leave of the court.
143
 The 
judge canvassed the issue of this leave, referring to an unspecified court 
rule, rather than a specific grievance. Mr Eckford was the Chairman of an 
Aboriginal Corporation and argued that, as such, no non-Aborigine 
Solicitor representative would be acceptable to his nation. The judge 
opined that since the company was a registered corporation under 
Australian law, the rule applied, suggesting representation by an officer of 
the court would be mandatory. Mr Eckford stated that the company has 
asked him to represent it, and the judge relented, without articulated 
reasoning, giving qualified leave for Mr Eckford to appear.
144
 It appeared 
the judge gave procedural leave so that Mr Eckford‟s subpoena could be 
struck out without an appealable ex-parte hearing.  
Mr Eckford submitted to the court that the matter was about very 
serious matters in issue. The judge rebutted this by holding that the only 
context that mattered was independent of any more fundamental 
underpinning matters. His honour went on to say that only the argued 
irregularity of the subpoena mattered.
145
 This holding was a preference for 
procedure over substantive law, an indicium of cultus in operation. 
Mr Eckford argued that Brewarrina and the Crown were avoiding 
substantive argument by limiting the court to procedural matters. Inferring 
irrelevance of the substantive issues, the judge asked only for submissions 
relevant to the interlocutory decision about the subpoena.
146
 
After Mr Eckford had alleged that Mr Byers unlawfully electronically 
recorded their conversation, the judge asked Mr Byers what he would say 
in the witness box if he were asked whether he used a recording device. 
Mr Byers failed to deny that allegation, but said he took file notes. Mr 
Eckford asked if he knew shorthand. The judge terminated this discussion 
summarily and said he thought Mr Byers was going to ask leave to strike 
out paragraph 16 of the Crown‟s affidavit. Mr Byers agreed with the 
judge. The judge stated that what Mr Byers said appeared entirely 
consistent with the usual practice of solicitors in their taking of file 
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notes,
147
 thus avoiding analysis, by resort to mere characterisation of 
propriety in procedure. 
Mr Bell alleged the subpoena was issued improperly. The judge 
corrected him and suggested it was issued irregularly.
148
 Mr Bell 
submitted that since there were no proceedings to determine the allodial 
title of the land, the wording of the subpoena was irregular. The logical 
error in this was a cultus view that no one had owned the land before 
British colonisation. This was a continuation of the doctrine of “terra 
nullius”, by which Aboriginal people were so far down the social scale, 
that their land title didn‟t matter. This was indistinguishable from the 
operation of a court cultus. 
The judge suggested that Mr Eckford was using the subpoena in this 
way for a collateral purpose. His honour continued that even if Mr 
Eckford had allodial title, that would not necessarily exempt the land from 
the State government‟s jurisdiction.149 This holding allowed for the 
possibility that it might so exempt the land. The judge omitted to follow-
up on this reasoning, leading to an apprehension of bias in an observer. 
Mr Bell submitted that it was difficult to determine what documents to 
produce.
150
 Mr Byers changed the issue and submitted that the court had 
power under the rules, namely, Rule 36,
151
 whereby the court could grant 
all appropriate relief whether sought or not. The judge agreed but said he 
would be slow to exercise this general power without a motion to that 
effect.
152
 Thus, the judge stated he would be prepared, albeit slowly, to 
grant relief whether or not it was sought. The judge entertained an 
undisclosed system by which the court would grant unsought relief, a 
veiled system of cultus inhering within the court. As reasoned above, this 
would infer bias, and therefore imply apprehended bias. 
Mr Eckford submitted that the New South Wales government and the 
Brewarrina Shire Council both must show when the land was transferred 
to them, for purposes of conducting a government by legitimate process. 
He referred to High Court of Australia case law stating that Aboriginal 
people did have proprietary interests in land, which continued pursuant to 
Aboriginal laws and customs. The judge then held that, in as much as 
traditional law was ever picked up by the Australian common law, any 
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allodial title would subsist under Australian law, and not under Aboriginal 
law. The judge ignored the High Court of Australia case law, implying 
that the court‟s cultus could override the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Mr Eckford stated his disagreement, referring to the 1888 case of St. 
Catherines Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen
153
 in the Privy 
Council in England, cited in Mabo and Others v Queensland (No. 2),
154
 a 
Canadian case.
155
 Mr Eckford continued that the case was authority for the 
proposition that Aboriginal title survived British sovereignty, and in fact, 
burdened Crown title. Mr Eckford argued that this burdened the Crown to 
prove its title to any proprietary rights the land. The judge asked Mr 
Eckford if his argument about Council‟s power to tax the property 
depended upon the validity of unilateral declaration of independence by 
the Euahlayi Nation. He apparently ignored the fact that it was 
independent for thousands of years before British occupation, and didn‟t 
need to prove its bona fides to occupiers ignorant of local history.
156
 
The judge held, without hearing further discussion on the point, that 
the Council was not acting as a feudal proprietor. It acted with the 
statutory authority of the Local Government Act, a State of New South 
Wales statute. This interesting holding, without the hearing of evidence, 
implied that a hierarchy of governments was not a feudal structure. His 
honour reasoned that since Councils in Sydney did not prove their title to 
Sydney householders, neither should the Brewarrina Council on Mr 
Eckford‟s lands.157 However, his honour had just admitted that Councils 
routinely failed to prove their title to operate governments on the lands. 
Apparently they felt they could operate governments by virtue of 
agreements between governments, the details of which appeared to have 
been veiled to the governed. 
The judge asked Mr Eckford if he accepted that traditional title 
operated by common law, and not by Aboriginal law. Mr Eckford 
identified this as a contested issue. The judge argued that this ran counter 
to Chief Justice Mason‟s dictum in Walker v State of New South Wales, 158 
whereby all people should stand equal before the law . . . .
159
 This 
proposition ran counter to reason, as traditional title would first operate by 
tradition. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
According to the article‟s discussion on cultus, a reasonable 
extrapolation may be made. If religion and the court systems similarly 
each had their cultus, in order to maintain both priesthood and public 
loyalty as instruments of governance, rather than the substantive law of 
the land, then anything unreasonable these priests did could be nullified, 
on certain conditions. In this argument, the state could comprise its 
religions as well as its other constitutional instruments of governance. If 
the state was to commit genocide, this could be nullified, provided public 
loyalty to the cultus was maintained. 
Lord Diplock‟s opinion on fairness suggested that overt resort to the 
court‟s cultus would constitute apprehended bias. Allowing a doctrine of a 
legally reasonable observer, therefore, facilitates the required nullification. 
The concept of legally reasonable observer is in reality the nullification 
discussed in this argument. Provided public loyalty holds good, 
apprehended bias could continue without remark. The pagan concept of 
loyalty serves to the same effect as the “way of salvation”, because why 
sacrifice the system if it saves you, but not others. In this instance, 
Aboriginal Australians have no equivalent to the doctrine of the “way of 
salvation”, and many are not loyal to the British-Australian system of 
justice. This means they have neither status as legally reasonable people, 
nor a method of cultically nullifying state acts of genocide. For them, 
genocide remains a serious and unaddressed grievance. 
In Ngurampaa Limited v Brewarrina Shire Council,
160
 there was no 
procedural right by which serious crimes against humanity could be 
addressed in the court. The judge gave leave for Mr Eckford‟s appearance, 
the natural consequence of which was that the court‟s procedure could 
continue and deny Mr Eckford any relief. Suggesting that unlawful 
occupiers, relatively recently arrived, could force long-term ancient 
owners to prove their title, from time immemorial, seemed specious at 
minimum. Asking the litigant if he recognised the principle that all people 
stood as equals before the law could only be seen as a petitio principii, or 
suggestive that in the judge‟s mind Mr Eckford was not a legally 
reasonable person. Were this true, the judge would have made decisions 
according to partially-veiled cultus rules, and would have been of the view 
that there was no apprehended bias. 
Should designating Mr Eckford as not a legally reasonable person be 
applicable in general to Aboriginal claims of genocide, then the operative 
Australian court cultus acted to abridge the juridical personality of a 
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whole culture of people, including their rights to practice their religious 
procedures and faiths. It would be over-reaching to claim that Aboriginal 
people could claim Magna Carta protection as freemen, as the concept of 
the English freeman, as a member of a livery corporation, is foreign to the 
Continent of Australia. This abridgment of juridical personality is a 
serious defect in judicial reasoning, as it could breach the international 
law against slavery. 
 
